Abstract
This paper represents an in-depth examination of Separation of Power issues
raised in the context of the Legislative and Executive Branch’s exercise of their War
Powers. Specifically, the paper considers the argument raised by the Bush Administration
that Congress cannot constitutionally infringe on the President’s exercise of his
Commander in Chief Power in the fight against terrorism. Such an argument would
effectively insulate most Presidential decisions related to terrorism from Congressional
oversight. The implication being that even if Congress wanted to accomplish something
like ending the detainment of detainees at Guatanamo Bay it would be outside their
Constitutional authority. The paper considers whether this argument is valid under either
a formalist or more contextual view of Separation of Powers, and ultimately concludes
that in any Branch conflict Congress should ultimately prevail.
Separation of Powers and the Commander in Chief: Congress’s Authority to
Override Presidential Decisions in Crisis Situations
By Reid Skibell1
“These cryptic words have given rise to some of the most persistent controversies in our
constitutional history.”
- Justice Jackson on the Commander in Chief Power
I.

Introduction: The Independent President

Throughout United States history Presidents have consistently argued that they
have strong inherent war powers, and in this sense the position taken by Bush
Administration is hardly noteworthy.2 It is true that the Bush administration is arguing
that the Commander in Chief Power gives the President some inherent authority to act in
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the domestic sphere, which has not been raised in a serious manner since World War II.
However, this is still not a new position in terms of the Constitutional history of the
United States. What is unique to the Bush Administration is a consistent argument that
the inherent and extensive war powers of the President may not be infringed upon by
Congress. While this implication might have been the logical result of past presidential
arguments for an expansive Commander in Chief Power, never before has it been
straightforwardly pursued as a theory. Past Presidents have realized thatthere was little
danger to Congress over-riding their decisions, and they did not want to raise such a
controversial position because it would make it difficult for courts to uphold independent
Presidential action. For example, it is likely that the reason the Supreme Court in Dames
& Moore v. Regan3 went to such great lengths to find tacit Congressional support for the
Iran hostage agreement was precisely because they did not want to probe the limits of
inherent Presidential power and raise the specter of Congressional exclusion.4 Despite the
conceivable tactical disadvantages of asserting such a position, the Executive Branch
contended in Padilla v. Rumsfield5 that his power to detain enemy non-combatant is
exclusive and cannot be infringed upon by Congressional statute.6 The Majority opinion
noted that, “if the President's Commander-in-Chief powers were plenary in the context of
a domestic seizure of an American citizen, the government's argument that the legislature
could not constitutionally prohibit the President from detaining citizens would have some
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force.”7 A similar argument is also being raised by the Administration in other contexts.
In the Guatanamo Bay detainee cases the President has claimed that Congress could not
constitutionally extend the jurisdiction of Article III courts to allow habeas corpus
petitions by detainees because such a law would be an infringement on Presidential
authority.8 Also, internal memos unearthed by the New York Times also demonstrate that
an argument is being raised within the Administration that the President is not bound by
treaties or statutes prohibiting the use of torture since they cannot legitimately restrict his
Commander in Chief Power. 9 Lastly, in a variety of areas the administration has used the
Commander in Chief Power as a general reason to withhold information from Congress
and to exclude it from decisions related to the war on terrorism.10
This paper will raise an argument that there is a danger to the political process in
recognizing that the President’s authority under the Commander in Chief cannot be
infringed upon by Congress. When there is some distance from a crisis, as there is
currently, Congress can use informal controls to ensure that it is part of the decisionmaking on terrorism decisions regardless of the division of Constitutional powers.
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Congress can assert itself by threatening to vote down legislation important to the
President, holding hearings to politically pressure the President, or even invoking its
impeachment power. The greater danger is that the Bush Administration may create a
precedent which would allow a President to act independently of Congress in the
aftermath of a crisis. Consequently, this paper will argue that Congress’ war powers are
sufficiently robust that it can countermand Presidential decisions justified under a broad
interpretation of the Commander in Chief Power. Part II will explain the historical danger
represented by national crises, and the role that isolated decision-making has played in
past mistakes. Part III will detail how much authority the Bush Administration claims to
possess under the Commander in Chief Power. This section will also deal with the
appropriations power and explain why it is not a sufficient check on Presidentialpowe r in
this context. Part IV will explore how under Separation of Powers formalism there would
be an argument for excluding Congress, and the problems with this approach. Part V will
compare formalism with a functionalist approach to Separation of Powers. After
considering arguments for why either Congress or the President could prevail under a
functionalist balancing test, this section ultimately conclude that Congress has a stronger
Constitutional interest. Finally, Part VI will conclude that it is imprudent and unnecessary
for the Executive Branch to raise this argument about excluding Congress from important
decisions related to the proclaimed “War on Terror”.
II.

The Dangers of Isolated Decision-making

The American experience of balancing liberty and national security during crises
has been riddled with mistakes - decisions that seemed to be legitimate at the time have
come to be regarded as regrettable errors in judgment. Each example exhibits a similar
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pattern of policymakers restricting civil liberties as part of an overreaction to a perceived
threat during a crisis, and later a public recognition that these restrictions were
unnecessary after the crisis has abated. Justice William Brennan captured the episodic
nature of this response when he wrote:
For as adamant as my country has been about civil liberties during peacetime, it
has a long history of failing to preserve civil liberties when it perceived its
national security threatened. This series of failures is particularly frustrating in
that it appears to result not from informed and rational decisions that protecting
civil liberties would expose the United States to unacceptable security
risks, but rather from the episodic nature of our security crises. After each
perceived security crisis ended, the United States has remorsefully realized that
the abrogation of civil liberties was unnecessary. But it has proven unable to
prevent itself from repeating the error when the next crisis came along.11
As illustrations for this theory Brennan pointed to examples such as the Alien and
Sedition Act of 1798, Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, the
Espionage Act of 1917, and the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War
II.12 The consistency of this failing over different historical periods and in response to
varying types of crises is disturbing, particularly given that some scholars argue that the
response to the terrorist attack of 9-11 evidences similarities to past overreactions.13
Furthermore, even if the government is properly striking a balance between civil liberties
concerns and anti-terrorist measures, this episodic history leads to sharply pessimistic
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predictions about what future reactions to domestic terrorism might look like. The nature
of terrorism is such that it is intended to create a climate of fear and insecurity, the
seemingly perfect ingredients for an overreaction.
Certain institutional patterns emerge from looking back at the history of American
reactions to security crises. One of the most evident features has been that decisionmakers in the quest for haste have acted to curtail civil liberties on the basis of less than
compelling evidence. For example, in March 1942 World War II Congress voted to ratify
President Roosevelt’s Executive Order that empowered the military to intern JapaneseAmericans on the basis of War Department evidence that there was a significant danger
from insurgents with relatively little debate. 14 However, it turned out this ‘evidence’ did
not in fact exist, and the War Department’s assessment of the danger was largely due to a
report by the openly racist General John L. DeWitt. 15 This example is fairly typical,
given that an examination of similar situations reveals that, “at the time the policies were
chosen at least some of the relevant decision-makers knew, and more should have known,
that the policies they were adopting were either responses to exaggerated threats or likely
to be ineffective in countering the real threats.”16
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This pattern makes more sense if looked at from the perspective of the decisionmaker.17 In the early stages of a crisis there is a need to act with haste and individuals
have to act on the basis of limited information. Under such difficult conditions mistakes
are understandably made, and it is reasonable that policymakers would err on the side of
restricting liberty.18 However, this does not fully account for the types of decisions that
have traditionally been made in the face of security threats. History demonstrates that
isolated decision makers, “are more likely to succumb to the perils of groupthink, selfdelusion, and hubris.”19 This finding is also consistent with the psychological evidence,
which tends to demonstrate that individuals who do not have to publicly defend the bases
for their decisions tend to use inconsistent logic and be overly motivated by emotion. 20 It
is this tendency that accounts for the fact that General DeWitt, as a front-line decision
maker, may have felt that he knew better than his superiors what the true risks were and
manipulated evidence to ensure that they made what he believed to be an accurate
assessment. 21
It is also noteworthy that mistakes in balancing civil liberties versus security have
been generally made by the Executive Branch. While this can be explained by the fact
that it is that arm of government which has been faced with making these types of
difficult choices, there are also reasons to be wary of unilateral Executive determinations
in times of war. The Framers were well aware that the Executive Branch incentives that
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differ from the other branches with respect to war. James Madison noted in a famous
passage that:
War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement. In war a physical force
is to be created, and it is the executive will which is to direct it. In war the public
treasures are to be unlocked, and it is the executive hand which is to dispense
them. In war the honors and emoluments of office are to be multiplied; and it is
the executive patronage under which they are to be enjoyed. It is in war, finally,
that laurels are to be gathered, and it is the executive brow they are to encircle.
The strongest passions, and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast;
ambition, avarice, vanity, the honorable or venial love of fame, are all in
conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace. 22
Madison was primarily concerned with the temptation of the President to engage in wars,
but there is a similar dynamic with respect to other types of decisions in the context of
warfare. One of the reasons that the public looks to the President in times of crisis is for
reassurance, and such strength is best demonstrated by actions which stress security at the
expense of liberty. 23 For example, the interment of Japanese-Americans was a symbol of
action that in the immediate aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor might have been
justified regardless of its usefulness. This is not to say that such a calculation necessarily
is a direct part of Presidential decision-making, but there is almost certainly an effect
from the fact that the President’s popularity is maximized by emphasizing security at the
expense of liberty during war-time. The fame that Madison references also creates an
accompanying sense of urgency to win swift decisive victories. Consequently, the
President may feel pressured to make sacrifices of civil liberties in an effort to further the
war effort, even in the absence of compelling evidence for such actions.
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These errors on judgments would not be so damaging if they were short-term, but
there is an institutionalization process by which temporary sacrifices of civil liberties
become cemented into national policy. In the initial stages of a crisis there is a general
willingness to defer to those who possess greater information. This has generally meant
that the Executive Branch has claimed informational hegemony, and the other branches
have been reluctant to question its determinations even when they have had serious
doubts. 24 Once this occurs a public position will have been taken with regard to the
policy in question, and the different stakeholders will be reluctant to reverse their
positions. 25
This does not mean that Congress is never willing to contradict itself on earlier
policy proclamations, but it does mean that there is an institutional inertia which must be
overcome. Congress has not always proven capable of exercising such will, and this
represents one of the dangers of an argument that it is not allowed to infringe on the
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President’s Commander in Chief Power. 26 Even if there is no judicial determination on
the accuracy of the Bush Administration’s position, it would still have serious
ramifications with regard to branch relations. The creation of it as a viable position would
have the effect of chilling Congressional action. Not only would it raise the level of
consensus and energy necessary to assume its designed role as a check on the President,
but it would provide an altogether too easy justification for Congressional inaction.
It is also true that Congress is not immune from making mistakes in its foreign
policy determinations. There is a critique of Congressional involvement in foreign policy
decision-making that challenges the institutional competency of Congress. Scholars
embracing this view generally argue that Congress acts too slowly, is prone to lapses in
secrecy, and is overly susceptible to changes in public opinion. 27 Notwithstanding the
accuracy or inaccuracy of this position, there is still reason to believe that Congress
should have some sort of role in the process. Congress is a broad- based representative
body and as such it has the power to unite the nation in a way that action by the President
alone cannot. Arguably from a political philosophy perspective, Congress is the only
body that has the jurisdiction to commit the nation to morally troubling action, especially
if it involved strong domestic repercussions. But perhaps the most compelling response to
this critique of Congress, particularly given the history of the United States in times of
crisis, is the one provided by John Hart Ely. Quoting from Alexander Bickel he notes,
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“Singly, either the President or Congress can fall into bad errors…So they can together
too, but that is somewhat less likely, and in any event, together they are all we’ve got.”28
III.

The Breadth of the Commander in Chief Power

Part of what makes the Bush Administration’s position regarding the
independence of the Commander in Chief so problematic is their vision of what the
Clause permits. They argue that it conveys authority onto the President beyond the
theater of military operations, and enables him or her to act within the domestic sphere.
They are not attempting to limit the scope of this position, and assert that President Bush
is empowered to undertake any type of action which he believes is reasonably related to
success in the war on terrorism. 29 The danger of giving the President such widespread
authority is that it allows the President intrude deeply into internal issues, much more so
than his or her normal domestic powers would allow, with an accompanying danger to
civil liberties.30
Most of the recent jurisprudence on the war powers is centered on whether the
President has the authority to engage in unilateral war-making, and arguments about what
powers the President has in the persecution of a war have come up infrequently. 31 For
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this reason the key cases that the administration has cited in support of its policies, Ex
Parte Quirin32 and the Prize Cases33, are from World War I and the Civil War
respectively. The President’s arguments thus breathe new life into them as meaningful
precedents for strong presidential powers. In the case of Quirin, this even involves
reinterpreting its meaning. In that decision the Supreme Court specifically declined to
decide whether the President had the inherent Constitutional power to convene military
tribunals absent Congressional authorization.34 Still, the administration points to Quirin
as standing for the proposition that the President may detain enemy non-combatants
absent any action by Congress. 35
If it is true that Congress cannot infringe on the Commander in Chief Power by
statute, then it is doubtful that it would be able to do so through its spending power.
While Congress’s ability to countermand an Executive decision to commit troops abroad
is fairly well-founded, the same is not true in the context of conduct of war decisions.36
When troops are sent abroad there are clear funds that must be allocated, but the same is
not true of how a war is conducted. The tenuous connection between the purposes that
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Congress hopes to achieve and the appropriations on which it would base its authority
makes it somewhat doubtful that the spending power imbues Congress with extra power
in this context. Some scholars have argued on this point that the appropriations is an all
or nothing grant; Congress can decide what to fund but it cannot use funding as an excuse
to dictate how things bought with those funds are utilized. 37 There is also a strong
argument to be made, based on Lovett v. United States38, that Congress may not achieve
through appropriations that which it cannot do through its normal powers.39 Essentially, if
Congress cannot constitutionally overturn the President’s decision to detain enemy
combatants by statute then it should not be able to do so through appropriations. 40
IV.

Formalism and the Mechanics of Congressional Exclusion

The Executive Branch has not fully fleshed out its argument for why Congress
should be excluded from interfering with the alleged power of the President to detain
enemy non-combatants. This is probably due to the fact that Congress has not directly
challenged any of the decisions made by the President, but it also reflects the fact that
they view the argument as relatively simple. And from a strict formalist perspective it is a
straightforward claim. Formalism in the Separation of Powers context is based on the
premise that the Constitution sought to clearly divide all governmental powers between
the three branches. The task for courts in Separation of Power disputes is thus one of
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categorization, to decide where the power was meant to be allocated. 41 The Bush
administration believes that the power to detain enemy non-combatants is part of the
Commander in Chief Power, and thus by definition it cannot be infringed upon by
Congress. Under formalism this ends the inquiry, and there is no need to balance the
competing constitutional interests of other branches given that, “where a power has been
committed to a particular Branch of the Government in the text of the Constitution, the
balance already has been struck by the Constitution itself.”42 While the President would
still need to justify why the power to detain emanates from the Commander in Chief
Clause, the desirability of the formalist framework for the President’s exclusionary
position is fairly evident.
Beyond the general arguments for formalism, which are beyond the scope of this
paper, there are some specific reasons for applying such an approach in this context.
There is one judicial precedent which states that Congress cannot infringe on the
President’s Commander in Chief Power, Chief Justice Chase dissenting opinion in the
1866 case of Ex Part Milligan. 43 However, he only devotes a couple of sentences to the
matter, and provides little analysis in support of the conclusion. 44 More powerful is the
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historical evidence which demonstrates that the Framers conceived of the Commander In
Chief Clause as a unique grant of authority to the President, outside of the reach of
Congressional action. This historical evidence is also so widely accepted that arguably
“there is a broad scholarly consensus that Congress may not interfere with the President’s
day-to-day command of an authorized war, or defense against sudden attack.”45
There was very little debate in the Constitutional Convention on the war powers
clauses and this makes it difficult to fully unpack the Framers’ intent. 46 It is still possible
to reach conclusions regarding the allocation of war powers, but scholarship in this area
has had to interpret from the structure of the clauses. For this reason, the Articles of
Confederation, as the antecedent to the Constitution, provide an important historical foil
for understanding the later distribution of war powers. Drafted in 1777 and ratified in
1781, the United States was governed by the Articles of Confederation until 1788. The
Articles vested all national powers in the Continental Congress, including all those
related to warfare. However, the Articles also show a clear demarcation of the war
powers in that of the clause granting authority to decide issues relating to peace and war
was separated from the appointment of a commander-in-chief to direct the Army or
Navy. 47 Additionally, under the structure of the Articles nine states would have to agree
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to declare war, and separately nine states would have to agree to the appointment of a
commander-in-chief. The requirement for separate supermajorities is demonstrative that
the decision whether to engage in warfare was deemed to be different from the decision
of how to supervise the conduct of the war. 48
While this difference between conduct and declaration of war existed in the
Articles of Confederation, there was no indication that the commander-in-chief of the
armed forces would be independent in his or her own sphere. In practice, the Continental
Congress saw itself as superior to George Washington in deciding how the Revolutionary
War was to be fought, and meddled with his command. 49 There was great dissatisfaction
with this arrangement and in drafting the Constitution the delegates sought to grant the
President more direct power to carry out a war. 50 Evidence for this intent can be found in
two places within the document. An early draft of the Constitution gave Congress the
Power “make war”, and one of the primary reasons for the change to “declare war” was
to make it clear that Congress was not to interfere with combat decisions. 51 On this point
Robert Turner notes:
The decisions associated with actually conducting hostilities are vested by the
Constitution in the Commander in Chief – and, indeed, the draft constitution was
specifically amended on August 17, 1787, to make this separation of powers more
clear. Should Congress, therefore – to give an extreme hypothetical – seek to
direct the President to attack a certain hill on a specified date with a specified
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military unit, such an effort would unquestionably be an unconstitutional
infringement upon the powers of the President as Commander in Chief. 52
However, this change does not necessarily mean that the Framers intended to
significantly increase the War Powers of the Executive Branch with this change. The
decision to change the language was made partially in response to a proposal by Pierce
Butler to vest the entire war power in the President and thus represents something of a
compromise. 53 While the linguistic change clearly signaled a desire to solely vest the
President with tactical decision-making power, it is not clear that it was meant to
accomplish anything more. 54
The other indication of this desire to entrust the responsibility for directing the
military to the President has to do with the precursors to the Commander in Chief Clause.
Dissatisfied with the inability of the Continental Congress to effectively govern, many of
the Constitutional delegates were greatly enamored with the constitutions of New York,
New Hampshire, and Massachusetts.55 Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 69 also
compares the powers of the President as Commander in Chief to the governor in the later
two states. 56 Consequently, there is a reason to believe that the war powers of the
President were modeled upon these state constitutions, and the wording of these
documents can provide insight into how the Commander in Chief Clause was meant to be
read. 57 These state Constitutions infused their governor with expansive war powers,
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particularly in how a war could be carried out. Massachusetts and New Hampshire
granted the governor as Commander in Chief the authority to fully control the military,
and to use it to, “ ‘kill, slay, and destroy’ by any appropriate means anyone who
attempted or planned to attack or even ‘annoy’[the state]”. 58 Furthermore, provisions
found in the other state constitutions which would have severely limited the power of the
Commander in Chief to direct a war, such as the formation of a joint council with control
over the military, were expressly not included.59 Taken together, the historical evidence
provides support for the argument that the judiciary should exercise special scrutiny when
evaluating possible Congressional infringements on the Commander in Chief Power.
Given that Congress was never meant to intrude open the Commander in Chief’s
discretion to conduct a war, the key question becomes whether the decision to detain
enemy non-combatants is a proper exercise of the Commander in Chief Power.
Consistent with its presumption that all powers are allocated by the Constitution,
formalism looks to the text of the Constitution itself to determine how to categorize
exercise of a power.60 In most instances the text itself is sufficient for the inquiry. For
example, the Bicameral Requirement at issue in INS v. Chadha 61 is clear on its face, no
textual or historical analysis is necessary to understand the meaning of the “explicit
constitutional requirement that all legislation be presented to the President for his
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signature before becoming law.”62 Similarly, in Public Citizen v. United States
Department of Justice63 it was apparent that the statute interfered with thePresident’s
Appointments Power, because the Appointments Clause establishes the “powers of the
Executive and Legislative Branches with admirable clarity”.64 This type of clarity is
missing with the Commander in Chief Clause, as there is an inherent ambiguity to what
the term connotes and how it interacts with war powers assigned to Congress. 65
When the text of the Constitution is not explicit, formalism does look to history
and usage to determine how powers were meant to be allocated. 66 In Loving v. United
States67 the petitioner argued that only Congress could make rules for the application of
the death penalty in military courts based on Clause 14 of Article I, § 8, which grants
Congress the power to promulgate rules for “the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval forces”.68 Clause 14 would seem to be an explicit grant of authority to the
Legislative Branch, but in a majority opinion Justice Kennedy noted that it was necessary
to do an exhaustive examination of English constitutional history in order to determine
whether the power was intended to be exclusive. 69 He concluded that, “the history does
not require us to read Clause 14 as granting to Congress an exclusive, non-delegable
power to determine military punishments.”70 Article 14 is certainly more clearly defined
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than the Commander in Chief Clause, as it includes verbs within it which give meaning to
the type of actions that can be justified as part of the power. Loving thus suggests that in
order to determine the meaning of the Commander in Chief Clause it is necessary to look
to what the Framers intended to convey through the power.
While the Framers intended that the Commander in Chief Clause would convey a
power to the President that would be independent on Congress, most of the evidence
suggests they felt this power would be very limited. Indeed, given the system of checks
and balances found throughout the Constitution it would seem incongruous that in one of
the most important areas of governance they would want to instill the President with
authority as broad as that argued for by the Bush Administration. The available historical
evidence backs up this contention, as it demonstrates that the Framers intended that the
Commander in Chief Clause would convey nothing more than that the President would
have independent authority in battlefield decisions. This is not to say that the detention of
enemy non-combatants cannot be justified under the President’s Commander in Chief
Power, on which this paper does not take a position. Rather, the point is that formalism is
based on an originalist position regarding the division of constitutional authority that is
inflexible in application, and the original understanding of the Commander in Chief
Clause is simply not consistent with the Administration’s argument for Congressional
exclusion.71
One of the strongest indications that the Framers had a narrow vision of what the
Commander in Chief Clause was supposed to mean is the possible war time authority
which they declined to entrust to the President. While the failures of the Continental
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Congress to manage the revolutionary war might have been the impetus for the Framers
to give the Commander in Chief independent authority to conduct a war, it is significant
that they did not address the major failing of the Continental Congress. Despite the fact
that George Washington’s inability to independently raise supplies had proven costly
during the Revolutionary War, the Framers still did not feel comfortable with giving the
President such authority. 72 Furthermore, the broad language of the war clauses from the
Massachusetts and New Hampshire constitutions, which were the model for the
Commander in Chief Clause, was also not included in the Constitution. These clauses
gave the chief executive of their respective states wide discretion to choose when and
how a war was to be conducted. Instead, they choose a title which at the time of the
Constitution’s drafting was a generic term denoting the highest officer in a particular
chain of command. 73 In all probability, the Framers probably sought to do little more
than confirm that the President would be the final authority on battlefield decisions, as
Louis Henkin notes: “there is little evidence that, by [the Commander in Chief Clause],
the Framers intended more than to establish in the Presidency civilian command of the
armed forces.” 74
There was little debate during the Continental Convention on the Commander in
Chief Clause, which in of itself suggests something about the Clause. The delegates
expressed great trepidation in general about powers conferred to the President, and the
fact that so little discussion was generated by the Clause is indicative that they felt it
bestowed little power. Wormuth and Firmage note on this point that, “even the most
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apprehensive members of the Convention did not fear the legal powers conferred by the
commander in chief clause.”75 In one of the few contemporary writings on the Clause,
Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers that it “would amount to nothing more than
the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces…”.76 While
Hamilton’s writing cannot be considered dispositive on the extent of the power, the
Supreme Court relied on it in one of its few pronouncements on the Commander in Chief
Power:
As commander-in-chief, [the president] is authorized to direct the movements of
the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them
in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the
enemy. 77
If the Framers intended for the Commander in Chief Clause to only convey authority to
direct the Army and Navy on the battlefield then the logical conclusion would be that
Presidential decisions external to that limited sphere would not be deserving of the same
degree of exclusivity. Or at the very least, it seems clear that there is a disconnect
between an expansive view of the Commander in Chief Clause and the argument from
formalism that Congress cannot infringe on the Power.
The second problem with applying the formalist position is that there is
overlapping and tangled authority between the branches in the war powers in a different
way then other parts of the Constitution. 78 It is not just the clause itself is ambiguous, but
the text does not sufficiently reveal how the Framers intended it to interact with
Congress’ war powers. This problem is compounded by the lack of definitive historical
75
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information on how the Framers intended the war power clauses to interrelate. Stephen
Carter goes so far as to argue that, “despite the devoted efforts of legions of scholars to
unpack the history of these clauses, I fear…the legislative history of the war mar making
power teaches us almost nothing concrete about the Framers’ understanding.”79
Consequently, the clear demarcation of powers ideal that lies at the heart of the formalist
understanding is difficult to sustain in the context of war powers.
In light of the overlap of the war powers, even some of the Court’s strongest
supporters staunchest supporters of a formalist position have tended towards a balancing
approach in war power cases. For example, in Dames & Moore v. Regan Justice
Rehnquist employed the more functionalist approach of Justice Jackson’s concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer80 in analyzing the Separation of Powers issues,
though he was careful to qualify that the method was not proper for all such cases. 81
Even more telling may be the separate opinions of Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas
in Loving. That case involved a grant of war power to the Congress, the Regulation
Clause, which is much more explicit in being an exclusive grant of power than the
Commander in Chief Clause. However, all three justices saw some degree of concurrent
authority for the Executive Branch by virtue of the Commander in Chief Power. Loving is
thus demonstrative that in practice the Supreme Court has difficulty in employing a
straight formalist approach to the war powers.
In his Majority opinion, Justice Kennedy explained that one of the reasons that
Congress could delegate authority to make regulations for the military death penalty was
that the Executive has some concurrent authority on the basis of the Commander in Chief
79
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Power. 82 Even more revealing was his statement that by virtue of the Regulation Clause,
“Congress… exercises a power of precedence over, not exclusion of, Executive
authority.” 83 This is something of a strange conclusion given that the history detailed by
Kennedy uses the strongest possible language in articulating that the Regulations Power
was given exclusively to Congress and was not meant to be subject to limitation.84 He
does not completely clarify the reason for this conclusion, but the language implies this is
due to the Executive’s concurrent authority. It would seem that Kennedy is rejecting
some of the central tenets of formalism by finding that the text and the history of Clause
14 are not conclusive in a Separation of Powers evaluation.
The concurring opinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas also acknowledge the
existence of some blurring between the Congressional and Presidential war powers.
While he is referring to an instance of cooperation between the branches, as opposed to
conflict, Scalia does note that:
[Article 14] does not set forth any special limitation on Congress's assigning to the
President the task of implementing the laws enacted pursuant to that power. And it
would be extraordinary simply to infer such a special limitation upon tasks given to
the President as Commander in Chief, where his inherent powers are clearly
extensive. 85
This language is far from a conclusion that a balancing test should be utilized in war
powers disputes between the branches, but it is an acknowledgement that the President’s
82
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war powers may overlie those of Congress. If not for some concurrent authority then
there would be no reason to afford special respect to an assignment of authority by
Congress in this area. Thomas is even more candid in conceding that the Commander in
Chief Power gives the President shared authority in this area. 86 Thomas explains that
there is a history of according Congressional decisions on military discipline great
respect, as well as the traditional deference given to the Commander in Chief. The
convergence of these two lines of thought means that Separation of Power decisions are
unique in this area:
I write separately to explain that by concurring in the judgment in this case, I take
no position with respect to Congress' power to delegate authority or otherwise
alter the traditional separation of powers outside the military context. 87
While Thomas confines this statement to military matters, the same would seem to be
true of Presidential decisions lying at the edge of the Commander in Chief Power. This
point will become more apparent in the next part of the paper, which demonstrates the
degree to which Congress’ war powers give it concurrent authority in how a war is
conducted.
V.

Balancing: Congress versus the Commander in Chief Power

Opposed to formalism is a functionalist perspective, which holds a different view
of the clarity of Constitutional allocations of power. Functionalism is predicated on the
idea that it is not always clear how the Framers intended powers to be allocated between
the branches, and indeed, this is of secondary importance. According to functionalism
what matters most is strengthening the overall aim of the Framers, namely a proper
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functioning system of checks and balances. 88 In the war powers context, functionalism is
most fully articulated in Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in Youngstown. 89 Jackson
emphasized the importance of how the disparatewa r powers were designed to interact as
a structure. In rejecting an approach that would simply try to categorize powers as
belonging to a particular branch he noted that, “the actual art of governing under our
Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context.” 90 In terms
of war powers, the division of authority between the branches suggested to him that the
Framers were trying to create a model of balanced institutional participation in war
decisions. It is this idea which underlies his tripartite method for analyzing Presidential
power, as it stresses that the President’s power is at its highest when he or she cooperates
with Congress.91 It was also on this basis that he rejected Truman’s argument for
inherent, and thus exclusive, authority to seize the steel mills. He felt that it would
subvert the Framer’s intent to so completely unfetter the President in the conduct of war.
92
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sometimes overlooked is that it is a framework that is supposed to be used for analyzing
Presidential power, and not for analyzing the Separation of Powers. Consequently, in a
zone three situation, where the President’s power is at its lowest, his or her power is only
low compared to where it could be if he or she were cooperating with Congress. It does
not necessarily mean that the President’s power is low relative to Congress. When
Congress and the President are in conflict a decision still needs to be made which branch
possesses the power. Roy Brownell delineates how Jackson suggested such a
determination should be made:
a third category action taken by the President would involve a constitutional
calculus just as it would for first and second category actions. The powers of
Congress would be subtracted from those of the President. If the President were
"in the red" so to speak, the action would be struck down, but if the President had
sufficient inherent power to overcome those of Congress, his action would be
upheld. 93
Essentially, Jackson was advocating a balancing test to decide where the power lies,
though the test would be broad in scope, looking to the overall Constitutional structure to
see which branch had more inherent authority. The consequence of finding that the
President had more inherent authority would be significant, because, “courts can sustain
exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting
upon the subject.” 94 Consequently, it would still be possible for a President to argue for
exclusive control under the logic of Jackson’s opinion. It is not even necessarily more
difficult compared formalism, it just appears that way because the tripartite structure
favors cooperation between the branches. However, in certain instances cooperation is
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not going to be possible, or perhaps even desirable, and at that point a calculus will need
to be made of which branch has more claim to authority based on inherent powers.
Why the President Should Win a Balancing Test
While Jackson interpreted the structure of the Constitution as favoring Congress
in a zone three situation, there is reason to believe that most courts would conduct such a
balancing test in a way that would be favorable to the Executive Branch. There is a line
of cases separate from the Youngstown strain that is sympathetic to claims of broad
Executive authority. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp95, the Supreme Court
held that great deference should be given to Presidential determinations in the context of
foreign policy, given the Executive Branches inherent policy-making advantages. 96 For
example, while the power to make treaties is divided equally between the President and
the Senate, Justice Sutherland argued for a sharply limited Congressional role:
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative
of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he
alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it.” 97
Curtiss-Wright, and its progeny, have come to stand for the proposition that broad
deference should accorded Presidential determinations in foreign policy, even when they
come into conflict with Congress. 98
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One of the pillars of the decision is that foreign affairs are different from domestic
affairs, and the special challenges of the external sphere are better suited to the strengths
of the Executive branch.99 Beyond the accuracy of this line of reasoning, which many
scholars find dubious, the case does not seem to support Presidential claims to domestic
power. 100 This point was made by the Majority in Padilla, which contended that CurtissWright was not implicated because at issue was the power to detain an American citizen
seized inside the United States. 101 This is something of an over-simplification of CurtissWright’s meaning, as there is a strong international component involved, but it certainly
limits how compelling the case is as a precedent. Furthermore, as Justice Jackson
emphasized in Youngstown, the use of the war powers to justify action in the domestic
sphere is particularly suspect. 102 As the earlier words of Madison indicated, the Framers
were well aware that times of war presented an opportunity for the Executive Branch to
seize power. 103 The internal/external dichotomy is the equivalent of a logical Rubicon, a
clear marker that will signal when there is a danger that the President has over-stepped
the bounds of his or her mandate to lead the nation.
In addition to the general respect to be afforded the President in foreign affairs,
there is another argument for Presidential authority beyond his or her inherent powers.
The President may be able to lay claim to special power on the basis of an emergency, or
authorization by Congress which would trigger his or her general Executive Power. The
Prize Cases demonstrate that in times of a national crisis the President can accomplish
99
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things that would not be normally possible under the Constitution.104 Arguably, the Prize
Cases represent a very special exception, but there is an inescapable logic to the fact that
compelling circumstances might justify Executive claims to strong powers.105 One of the
advantages of the Executive Branch that Sutherland emphasized in Curtiss-Wright is the
speed with which the President can act, and it seems reasonable that in the immediate
aftermath of a crisis this characteristic might need to be called upon. However, this power
would seemingly decrease in direct proportion to the amount of time that has elapsed
since the crisis. Furthermore, this advantage of swift decision-making would be negated
by Congressional action, so it is not clear on what basis the Prize Cases would empower
the President in a branch conflict. Indeed, the Supreme Court in the decision stressed that
one of the bases of its decision was that Congress later ratified the action. The different
concurring opinions in thePrize Cases actually, “offer affirmative support for the view
that the President’s commander in chief power can by limited by the Congress in the
exercise of its own powers. They lend no support at all to the opposite proposition.”106
The opposite of the emergency power situation is when Congress has acted to
ratify Presidential action. Under the Youngstown tripartite structure the President’s power
would be at its zenith, and in a branch conflict later attempts to control this power may be
frowned upon. Congressional flip-flopping on important issues plays into the critique of
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Congress as an institutionally flawed actor, and undercuts arguments for their inclusion.
Just how much weight Congressional ratification should given is difficult to quantify.
However, in a structural sense something very similar happens when Congress declares
war, triggering the full force of the Commander in Chief Power, and later attempts to
change the parameters of the conflict. This will be explored in greater detail in the next
section, as well as arguments for why Congress’ war powers empower it to regulate the
conduct of a war. 107
Why Congress Should Win a Balancing Test
What must be weighed against the powers of the President are Congress’ own
War Powers, and the structural considerations which underlie them. The case for
Congress winning a balancing test is predicated on two of the three Congressional War
Powers: the War Clause and the Army Clause.108 While it is somewhat a simplification of
the war powers structure, it is evident that without an army to command or a war to fight
the Commander in Chief Power would have no meaning. In a sense, the existence of the
President’s war power is contingent on exercises of Congressional power. This situation
is reflected in the fact that the War Clause and the Army Clause empower Congress to set
substantive limits on the parameters of the Commander in Chief Power. If Congress
limits the scope of a war to a particular theater, or only allocates a certain amount of
manpower, then the President must work within these limits. These powers extend so far
as to allow Congress to change the boundaries of the President’s mandate to direct a war
after it has commenced. Consequently, while it was not contemplated that Congress
would make tactical decisions, the Framers imparted onto Congress substantial authority
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to direct the conduct of a war. To the extent that Congress is superior to the Commander
in Chief in making these determinations, there is strong support for the proposition that in
a branch conflict it has a stronger Constitutional interest in seeing its will asserted, and
should prevail over the President.
The War Clause grants Congress the power to declare war, grant letters of
marquee and reprisals, and make rules concerning captures on land and water. What is
important for the question at hand is the fact that in a series of early cases the Supreme
Court decided that this included the authority to declare limited wars, and that Congress
could determine the scope of those limits. 109 These cases were decided in a period from
1800 to 1804, and their historical proximity to the writing of the Constitution gives them
special importance. The Supreme Court has recognized that contemporaneous legislative
determinations of the meaning of the Constitution are to be accorded a marked degree of
interpretive weight. 110 Here there are not only not only legislative acts which
demonstrate that Congress can define the limits to a war, but judicial decisions as well.
These cases involved a naval war with France in which Congress placed both use
and area restriction on the exercise of military power. The original legislation provided
that only public ships could engage French ships found to be ‘hovering’ off the U.S.
coast. Later, the use restrictions were broadened to include armed U.S. merchantmen, and
the area restrictions were changed to allow the engagement of all French ships. 111 The
fact that these limits changed over time is important, because the cases, “suggest that

109

See Wormuth and Firmage, supra note 41, at 58-60 (noting that the possibility of limited war was
decided by Bas v. Tingy (1800), Talbot v. Seeman (1801), and Little v. Barreme (1804)).
110
Id. at 61 (arguing that special weight should be given to the three decisions).
111
See Banks and Raven-Hansen, supra note 37, at 155 (discussing the legislation involved in the naval
war); Wormuth and Firmage, supra note 41, at 58.

32

Congress may change the limits and therefore the scope of [a war] while it is being
fought”. 112
In the last of these cases related to the naval war, Little v. Barreme, the
President’s orders conflicted with the dictates of Congress, but Congress’ will was still
considered determinative. Chief Justice Marshall explained that the fact the Presidential
directive violated a statute meant that it was null and could not insulate the captain of the
naval vessel from liability. 113 Marshall pointed out that the captain had to be held liable
no matter how pressing the circumstances that might have justified his belief that he
should seize the vessel in question. He thus recognized that even in the rapidly changing
circumstances of naval engagement the will of Congress with respect to how the war was
to be fought had to take precedence. 114 This is strong support for the proposition that the
War Clause allows Congress to define significant aspects of how the Commander in
Chief can conduct a war.
The Constitution was written prior to the existence of a standing army, and
consequently it was only when the Congress called forces into existence that the
President could exercise his Commander in Chief Power. 115 The Framers also clearly
envisioned the power to fund the military as continuing to give Congress the authority to
rein in Executive war-making even after such a force had been called into existence. 116
What is less evident is what authority does the power to raise and supply the army give
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Congress to control the combat decisions of the Commander in Chief. Congress plays
some role by virtue of the fact that it makes the decisions concerning what type of army
to fund. 117 This necessarily impacts some of the parameters of the President’s authority,
as it dictates what number and type of forces can be deployed. On this point Stephen
Carter relates:
Unless there is a Platonic essence called “army”…then the most sensible
understanding of the constitutional language is surely that the Congress can raise
the army it wants, no other army exists for the President to command. If the
Congress says the army shall consist of no more than one million soldiers, I see
no way that the President can recruit one million and two. If the Congress says the
army shall have no more than two thousand tanks, the President possesses no
authority to purchase three thousand instead. 118
Just because there is currently a standing army should not decrease the authority that the
Clause was meant to express. The modern army is a convenience that allows the nation to
act with speed in responding to a threat, thus facilitating deterrence. It may delegate this
authority to the President, but the only way to give the Clause substantive meaning is to
assume that with each new conflict the Congress gets to decide the composition of the
force. For example, this means that Congress could decide that nuclear weapons are not
to be part of the arsenal allocated to a particular conflict, which would have the effect of
only allowing the President to use conventional weapons. 119
Similar to the decision to not allocate to the President nuclear weapons for a
conflict, Congress could seemingly not fund troops for a particular theater of operation.
Congress has the power to decide whether or not to raise an army for a particular war, so
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there is no reason why it could not dictate that the army was brought into being only to
fight in one country but not another. Carter uses the example of an army that was
restricted from fighting against Canada to explain why the distinction between
size/component decisions and area restrictions is arbitrary:
Nothing in the language of the Constitution suggests a distinction between rules
limiting the number of tanks and limiting the theater of operations…the rule
prohibiting war making against Canada is also a restriction on what the armed
forces shall be: they shall not be the sort of armed forces that fight a war with
Canada, just as they shall not be the sort of armed forces that…purchase tanks
more than three thousand. 120
While Carter’s point is well taken that the decision to raise a particular army involves
more than simple numbers of arms and manpower, it is easy to understand how this could
overwhelm any sense of an independent Commander in Chief. Given the existence of a
standing army and the fact that most wars are not officially declared by Congress,
Congress may have tacitly agreed to the existence of a certain “type” of army for
purposes of a conflict. Allowing Congress to later decide that this army was not created
to participate in a particular theater of combat would seem to intrude open the President’s
core Commander in Chief Power. After a war has been authorized, the practical dictates
of combat mean that the Commander in Chief must be given some leeway to determine
what the proper field of combat is and how to make best use of the available manpower.
So just how far the Army Clause allows Congress to control an army in a declared war is
unclear; but given the lack of a standing army in the Framer’s time, it is apparent that the
Clause was meant to convey a great deal of influence to Congress. Consequently, in most
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situations where there would be a conflict between the branches the Army Clause should
tip a balancing test in favor of Congress.
Beyond the two Clauses there is additional evidence for why Congress
should prevail in a balancing test. Historical practice demonstrates that Congress has
repeatedly infringed upon the Commander in Chief Power, including its core meaning of
tactical decision-making. For example, on a number of occasions Congress has directly
mandated or limited the movement of troops. In 1794 Congress authorized the stationing
of up to 2,500 militiamen in Pennsylvania. 121 In 1836 Congress appropriated money for
the removal of Fort Gibson from Indian Territory to a location near the border of
Arkansas. 122 In 1940 Congress provided that no military selectee could be stationed
outside of the Western hemisphere. 123 Wormuth and Firmage contend this practice has
been historically widespread, and that, “it is not for want of constitutional power that
Congress has not controlled the movement of troops more directly; it is because the
problems of military management do not lend themselves to legislative decision.” 124
Wormuth and Firmage also point to the large number of instances in which
Congress has limited Presidential access to the military. For example, in 1947 Congress
enacted the National Security Act, which established the chief of staff system. This had
the effect of making it impossible for the President to convey an order except through the
medium of a designated subordinate, the secretary of defense. If the subordinate was
recalcitrant, there would be no way for the President to issue orders to the lower echelons
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of the military hierarchy.125 Similarly, in 1908 acted to limit the circumstances in which
the President could request assistance from the National Guard, and entrusted state
governors with the task of calling out the Guard. 126 These statutes set up structures that
limited the President to command the military, and as such are arguably invasive
infringements on the Commander in Chief Power. Presidential acquiescence to them thus
supports the conclusion that it is within the power of Congress to limit the authority of
the Commander in Chief.
VI.

Conclusion

While some of the subsidiary arguments within this paper could be extended
further; in reality, the paper stands for a very limited proposition: it would be imprudent
and contrary to the Constitutional structure to argue that Congress does not have the
power to over-ride Presidential decisions justified by an expansive view of the
Commander in Chief Power. In most time periods this would also be considered to be a
fairly uncontroversial position. For example, in a 1990 academic work Vice President
Cheney was sharply critical of what he considered to be Congressional overreaching in
foreign policy; however, he was also explicit in relating that Congress has a role to play
in the formulation of a successful foreign policy. He explained each branches role in
relation to what he considered to be their strengths:
Congress was intended to be a collective, deliberative body. When working at its
best, it would slow down decisions, improve their substantive content, subject
them to compromises, and help build a consensus behind general rules before they
were to be applied to the citizenry. The presidency, in contrast, was designed as a
one-person office to ensure that it would be ready for action. Its major
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characteristics, in the language of Federalist No. 70, were to be ‘decision,
activity, secrecy and dispatch”. 127
Everything that Cheney said is consistent with this paper’s conclusions, as certainly the
speed and decisiveness of the Executive Branch are considerable advantages in
responding to a crisis. However, deliberation and consensus-building are also valuable
characteristics, and given this nation’s history of overreacting to crisis situations there is
good reason to believe they may be of primary importance. As the third anniversary of 911 approaches, which the Executive Branch argues is the trigger for its expanded
authority, it also seems unrealistic to continue to be stressing speed over deliberation. At
the very least it seems important to hold open the possibility of Congressional action.
Arguments for excluding Congress create the possibility that the Executive Branch will
be wholly unaccountable, with the accompanying traditional dangers associated with
fully insulated decision-making. There may be a value to having uncertainty and a certain
degree of flux in the demarcation of war powers that risks being lost by aggressive steps
by one branch to carve out an area of exclusive authority. The fact that such a position
has never been advanced by a President in our Constitutional history should make the
Executive Branch, and the Supreme Court for that matter, pause; and consider that
perhaps engagement with Congress would be more fruitful than attempts to exclude it as
an actor.
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